The United States Supreme Court is widely observed to be easing restrictions on corruption, leading some to fear for the state of democracy in the country. This was recently evidenced in the case involving Snyder v. United States. At the surface level, this seemed to revolve around the technical classification of bribery and ‘gratuities’ under the U.S. criminal code. However, the ruling delivered on June 26, 2024, significantly reduces the legal authority of federal prosecutors in dealing with corrupt government officials.
The court’s conservative majority concluded in a 6-3 verdict, across ideological fault lines, that the conviction ruling against Snyder for bribery, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the appeals court, were not appropriate. The justices argued that Snyder’s charges should not have been initiated as the federal corruption law Section 666, which was involved in this case, applies exclusively to bribes and does not include gratuities. They went on to clarify that bribes must be paid before an official action and not after its completion. As Justice Brett Kavanaugh aptly put in his majority opinion, it‘s not always necessary for federal prosecutors to target minor local criminals since many states and municipalities have their own regulations concerning politicians and gratuities, alleviating the need for the Department of Justice to intervene.
The Supreme Court’s definition of corruption, particularly in the realm of campaign financing, has also been steadily constricting. Back in 2007, the court decreed in the case known as WRTL II, that corruption in political campaigns must involve a direct exchange or ‘quid pro quo’ where a campaign contribution leads to a certain action from an official. This definition suggests that a bribing individual needs to brazenly request a specific vote from a legislator in return for cash. Clearly, the majority of bribery instances are less direct, a fact the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged.
Earlier, under the leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, justices from both the liberal and conservative sides identified manipulation by political contributors, aimed at dictating the agenda for political parties and elected officials, as unlawful corruption of the political process. Moreover, as established by the Rehnquist Court, corruption doesn’t only manifest in explicit quid pro quo agreements but also in improper influence over a holder of public office’s judgment, or even in the appearance of such influence.
Yet another controversial move by the Roberts Court in normalizing money’s sway in politics was the groundbreaking Citizens United decision. Enforced in 2010, the Citizens United ruling asserted that corporations enjoy a First Amendment right to impart unlimited funding to political Ads in any US election. The court reinforced this position in 2014 by dismissing the cap of $123,000 total per individual on donations to federal candidates over a biennial electoral cycle, set in McCutcheon v. FEC. The court reiterated that campaign finance regulations should solely combat explicit quid pro quo corruption, or ‘money traded for political favors’.
The Roberts Court has seemingly cornered what constitutes corruption in cases involving white-collar crime as well. In the 2016 McDonnell v. United States decision, the justices determined that it was not an offense when Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell promoted a questionable health product for a man who had purchased clothes for McDonnell’s wife and financed his daughter’s wedding. In 2020, the Supreme Court ruled out the prosecution of Bridget Anne Kelly, who was implicated in the 2013 Bridgegate Scandal where aides to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, including Kelly, contrived a severe traffic jam on the George Washington Bridge as political retribution.
In the 2023 Percoco v. United States case, Joseph Percoco, a close associate of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, had been found guilty of fraud in 2018 for accepting $315,000 from two New York-based firms in return for the promotion of policies beneficial to their operations. However, the Supreme Court discarded the verdict largely because the money was transferred while he was serving during Cuomo’s 2014 election campaign, which meant he was not officially employed by the government at that time.
There is growing concern that a slackening legal position on corruption from the Supreme Court threatens the credibility of the American democratic system, as I elaborate in my recent book, ‘Corporatocracy’. Successive rulings, from McDonnell to Kelly to Percoco to Snyder, have steadily trimmed the claws of anti-corruption laws. This trend seems to send a decidedly dangerous signal to those involved in shady practices: that they can behave unethically, secure in the knowledge that legal repercussions are likely to be minimal.
This could potentially enhance the confidence of those engaging in corruption, influencing them to continue with few legal repercussions. This legal leniency towards corruption thus poses a significant risk to good governance, striking repeated blows to its effectiveness.