Recently, insider sources have reported that a duo from Elon Musk’s Government Efficacy Department (abbreviated as DOGE) have obtained access to extremely sensitive networks that safeguard classified details of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. These two persons are Luke Farritor, a young professional who interned at SpaceX, and Adam Ramada, an entrepreneur based in Miami. Their access to these extraordinarily confidential systems has reportedly been in effect for a fortnight, as confirmed by the aforementioned sources who have the ability to access these same networks.
Prior to their involvement with the DOGE, both Farritor and Ramada had no recorded interactions with either nuclear weapons or classified data. Contrary to these assertions, a representative from the Department of Energy (DOE) entirely rejected the claim that the duo had infiltrated these networks. The DOE spokesperson depicts this reports as blantly incorrect, emphasizing that no DOGE staff had access to these crucial National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) systems.
The spokesperson further added that the two DOGE affiliates, namely Ramada and Farritor, served their agency for a brief period and ultimately left the DOE in February. The original sources, who anonymously reported this information, declined to reveal their identities, citing lack of authorization to publicly comment on such matters. However, they state their ability to visually confirm the presence of Ramada’s and Farritor’s names in the directory of these classified networks.
The directory of these networks, used by thousands of nuclear workforce at various facilities and labs across the country, is visible to authorized personnel, but access to the networks themselves is restricted only to specific terminals, secured within designated classified information handling areas. Despite the presence of DOGE staff names on the network, it does not necessarily grant them complete access to the classified information. As relayed by several domain experts, this is because information within the networks is stringently controlled based on the need-to-know principle.
Back in February, DOGE affiliates, including Farritor, were rumored to be requesting authentication to these covert computer systems. Chris Wright, the then Energy Secretary, vehemently dismissed these rumors, clearly stating that DOGE personnel would not be allowed on these top-secret networks. Wright further clarified that despite circulating rumors of DOGE seeing the country’s nuclear secrets, none of it held any truth since they lacked the required security clearances.
The sources disclosed that the networks they were referring to were utilized by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense. They contain heavily classified data on the country’s significant nuclear arsenal. The first network, known as the NNSA Enterprise Secure Network, provides detailed restricted data about America’s nuclear weapons blueprint and an assortment of special nuclear resources used in these weapons, among other things.
This heavily guarded network allows information related to highly secret technical data to be transferred among the NNSA, the country’s nuclear weapons laboratories, and various facilities responsible for storing, maintaining, and upgrading the national nuclear arsenal. The second network in question is termed the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). Primarily utilized by the Department of Defense for exchange of data with the Department of Energy pertaining to nuclear weaponry, SIPRNet is also used for a wider dissemination of data classified at the secret level, the leakage of which might cause potential risks to national security.
Access to both of these networks usually necessitates obtaining a ‘Q’ clearance, the highest level of security clearance provided by the Department of Energy. While acquiring this clearance involves a prolonged process, it can be expedited for special circumstances. At this stage, even though account creation for both DOGE employees has been confirmed by sources, the level of their access to the classified data remains an area yet to be clarified.
One source familiar with the matter, willing to ignore the classified nature of the Department of Energy’s systems, disclosed that DOGE officials’ presence on these classified systems indicated a step-up in DOGE’s recently obtained privileges within the agency. They, however, made it very clear that these accounts would not provide the officials an unrestricted access to all stored data. They portrayed this access as a preliminary step that would allow DOGE employees to request information at the secret classified level that might potentially lead to broader access.
The presence of DOGE employees in routes to classified information could be a requirement to discuss program specifics and future budget priorities, says Hans Kristensen, head of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. He explains that while a significant part of the nuclear weapons budget ultimately becomes unclassified, there are numerous classified details that contribute to forming those figures. It is unlikely that any of such classified details would be publicly accessible.
The impact of the administrative efforts made by the Trump era to downscale the government has already been experienced by the NNSA. In February, numerous employees were abruptly dismissed from the nuclear agency under DOGE’s directive. This decision was however promptly overruled and in the end, less than 50 employees were terminated.
Backlash is being received as reports of DOGE’s indiscreet handling of data across the government have emerged. Concerns heightened following an incident earlier this month when a whistleblower revealed evidence suggesting that DOGE affiliates not only gained high-level access but may have copied and possibly removed sensitive data from internal systems of other agencies.
Fears were further accentuated when DOGE officials requested that their actions should be off the record and subsequently undertook actions to conceal their activities on the system. Such actions included disabling monitoring tools and deleting records of their access. The matter became increasingly alarming when suspicions arose pertaining to uninvited log-in attempts from an unidentified Russian IP address using the newly issued DOGE credentials.