The ongoing conflict in Gaza, sparked by Hamas’ offensive on October 7, 2023, has people wondering about the fallout once the warfare ceases. An emerging worry is the potential for warlords or criminal syndicates to seize power in a Gaza bereft of centralized governance. Widespread is the experience of wars birthing black markets and syndicates of crime, with the situation in Gaza not being distinct. An episode of particular concern took place in November when 109 United Nations aid trucks were raided by armed looters.
The last year has seen a black-market boom in tobacco, causing significant disturbances to humanitarian aid convoys. Criminal groups have been implicated in robbing aid shipments to secure tobacco, which can be sold for lucrative sums of $25 to $30 per cigarette. While the Israeli army is resolved to obliterate Hamas, Israel has yet to disclose its plans for a post-conflict Gaza. The Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to reject appeals for the Palestinian Authority to assume governance over Gaza.
Hamas, despite its repressive methods of ruling and violence against its own citizens, also bore the mantle of local governance in Gaza. With its current weakened state, there is a threat of a governance void in Gaza. Vacuums of power often act as breeding grounds for criminal dominance, resulting in mob-like entities, often tied to familial or tribal systems, stepping in to usurp traditional governmental functions, thereby competing with any existing weak official establishments.
Scenarios could even devolve into explicit warlordism, where territories get distributed among armed entities, evolving into self-regulated domains. These formations are typically challenging to defeat and often keep violence cycles spinning; case examples include Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Restricted conditions imposed by warfare tend to stimulate the formation of black markets, which handsomely reward and augment the groups controlling these conduits, often leading these entities to morph into quasi-political organisms.
Gaza, even before the ongoing conflict, might have had an unfair advantage towards this trajectory. With rigorous Israeli and Egyptian import restrictions leading to shortages of basic goods, a flourishing black market had already set up shop. Many of Gaza’s clans, expansive family networks tied by blood and marriage, have historically been deeply entwined in these illegal transactions.
Some convoy raids might be attributable to people hard-pressed to secure food and other essentials, but predominantly they were targeted by armed crime syndicates. It is less likely for these to be spontaneous acts of looting by desolate Gaza civilians. There’s suggestive evidence that the armed groups organizing these convoy attacks are likely connected with the clans of Gaza.
In the aftermath of the Israeli military campaign, the government of Hamas in Gaza lies in ruins, with no civilian administration or any alternate power structure to fill the gap. The practice of Israel raiding specific regions and then retreating fosters power vacuums, triggering rampant crime and lawlessness, sometimes even leading to the return of Hamas. However, there remains a chance that Hamas, surviving the conflict, could regain some degree of control over Gaza.
Yet, if Israel does succeed in obliterating or disabling Hamas, it is inevitable that the clans of Gaza, as some of the only organized entities remaining, would step in to fill the power void. Traditionally, tribes have provided security services for their own protection and lucrative opportunities. Such responses are typical in the wake of central authority collapses.
Possibly, these groups could advocate for more humane conditions than those under Hamas. Still, scholarly studies hint at high logistical and economic burdens caused by disjointed, unofficial governance. In the past, the Israeli government considered the possibility of the clans officially taking over governance, a proposal that was promptly dismissed by the clans. However, their formal rejection may not impede them or other factions from exercising implicit control once the warfare concludes.
Gaza’s long term stability is a critical concern. While it is a relatively small territory compared to Haiti, Somalia, or Afghanistan, both Israel and Egypt, with their strict control over Gaza’s borders, would want to avoid a chaotic situation in Gaza, which could disrupt their own security—essentially how the ongoing conflict initially took shape. Yet, the longer Gaza remains without any civilian administration, the stronger local armed factions will become, and evicting them could become increasingly difficult.
This kind of environment can lead to a hybrid system in many regions around the globe, where national-level control is held by official government authorities, but local territories are under the daily control of gangs. This model, as exhibited by drug cartels in Mexico, paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland, and Central American gangs like MS-13, can prove quite resilient and lucrative for the armed factions involved. Still, for ordinary citizens, it implies living under a violent, authoritarian rule, with their lives and livelihoods hinging on the whims of armed individuals.
Another historical proposition is to absorb the armed groups into a future government setup. However, this is not a foolproof solution, as it could result in criminal groups persisting, frequently allied with political factions or government officials, exploiting the public. Yet, it provides a transition towards peace-time governance and some centralization of official authority. In the absence of a central government or if it’s too frail to assert dominance, it could lead to much more severe consequences.
One such worst-case example is currently unfolding in Haiti, where armed groups, initially formed as minor criminal gangs, often connected to diverse politicians, have now overwhelmed the country’s government. They subject ordinary citizens to violent rule. The achievement of Hamas’ defeat, without having a succession plan in place, could lead to subsequent crises. This simple fact underlines the crucial importance of a thought-through and viable post-conflict strategy for Gaza.