Undoubtedly, the current administration’s approach to international relations, particularly with China, leaves much to be desired. Jake Sullivan, Biden’s chosen national security advisor, is headed to Beijing, ostensibly for talks meant to demonstrate the United States’ capacity to manage its differences with China. Yet, under Biden’s leadership—or lack thereof—these discussions are likely to result in little meaningful progress. This marks Sullivan’s fifth rendezvous with the executives of the communist regime in less than a year and a half, a statistic that reveals more about the administration’s insubstantial policy towards China than anything else.
The main stumbling blocks in these exchanges will hinge on key topics including Taiwan, Russia, and the control of fentanyl, among other issues. But there’s little faith that Sullivan will be able to articulate the US stance effectively, given that the administration has so far demonstrated ambiguity rather than certainty in their approach. For instance, their stated intention to emphasize Taiwan’s position and express apprehension regarding China’s assistance to Russia is diluted by the apparent unproductivity of previous talks.
With the hopes of a friendlier future administration setting the stage, China seems ready to wage its own demands. They take issue with America’s backing of Taiwan, which they assert as their own territory, and the control the US exerts on tech exports to China. Strangely enough, the Chinese government wants the Biden administration to abate its pressure on these fronts. This, they believe, would lead to better rapport with the next US president—a target that may showcase their misguided confidence in finding a softer successor.
In the face of all these developments, ironically, stability is China’s greatest concern. They seek to keep the status quo intact throughout the remainder of Biden’s term, masking their desires with diplomacy while waiting for, what they consider, inevitable change. This brings us to an inevitable question—how did we end up here with our global competitor?
A potential meeting between Biden and Xi Jinping is also expected to surface in these discussions. However, the overall climate of the conversation holds little promise. With the nagging issues of Taiwan and Ukraine unraveling the tapestry of diplomatic discourse, the path forward looks obscure. Under the Biden administration, these pivotal points are more likely to ignite conflict than foster understanding.
Unequivocally, the aforementioned issues hold consistent reviews as inflamed points of contention between the US and China. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s growing hostility towards Taiwan exemplify these trouble spots. Yet, the course of action is unclear. Should Sullivan pursue a hard-line policy, urging China to dial back its support of Russia, or should he pander to Beijing’s expectations as the Biden administration has done so far?
This seemingly unthinkable act of support from China towards Russia’s war endeavours reeks of bad faith diplomacy from the former. Purchases of massive amounts of Russian oil and battlefield technology provisions stubbornly persist. Yet, Beijing seems more than happy to retain Moscow as an ally in their back and forth struggle with the US. Despite the clear troubling trajectory of this trio’s dynamic, the Biden administration’s efforts to counter it seem laughably insufficient.
As part of their defense, Chinese diplomats will likely question America’s aid to Taiwan. Xi has threatened to seize the island forcefully if required, berating the US for supporting Taiwan’s independence through military assistance and diplomatic exchanges. Yet, amid harsh criticisms, the US administration’s stance remains indecisive, revealing that perhaps they are not ready to take the initiative on such crucial matters.
In part of China’s Sunday statement, they conveyed that the US had been ‘containing and suppressing China’, making it clear what their perspective is on the relationship. Amid claims of the alliance remaining at a pivotal point of stability, Taiwan was marked as a non-negotiable element of their agenda. This merely showcases how far the current administration has allowed things to go without offering a firm counterpoint.
An interesting point of contention is Sullivan’s upholding of the current administration’s regulations on exports that prohibit China from accessing advanced American semiconductors. As it turns out, China is not so keen on this particular policy. Despite pouring billions into research, Beijing lags behind in designing advanced chips, an ogre they blame on export controls that they feel aim to stunt their development.
Initially implemented in October 2022, these restrictions have had significant global implications. They’ve forced countries to consider moving some production of semiconductors out of Asia, potentially back to North America and Europe. It might be wishful thinking to hope that China’s repeated attempts to find a workaround could lead to self-reliance rather than continued shadowy dealings.
Sullivan’s Beijing visit might also serve to arrange one last meeting between Biden and Xi. Unusually, Biden could be the first president not to visit China since Carter—another tasteless tidbit from an unremarkable administration. Biden’s previous trip to China as vice president in 2011 was characterized by his informal dining experiences—not exactly the memorable statesmanship one would hope for.
If Biden’s track record is any indication, China is likely uninterested in engaging further with a dwindling administration. Their focus has probably shifted to engagements with the next administration and crafting a careful approach to ensure future negotiations are beneficial on their terms.
Insights from Chinese international relations scholars published in Foreign Affairs magazine this month indicate that there is minimal wiggle room for a change in US-China relations regardless of whether it’s a Trump or Harris administration next. This is because the tough stance on China will be guided by pressing domestic factors, not necessarily the president’s preference.
As the US continue navigating the uncertain political waters until the next election, it is clear that China is treading with caution, hardly optimistic about the outcome. However, it’s high time for the US to pull up its socks, adjust its stance, and adopt a more robust approach to China, particularly under new leadership—something the Biden administration has visibly failed in its entirety.