In May 2022, a group of psychiatrists and gynecologists made their initial trips to the liberated parts of Kyiv and Kherson oblasts. Within mere months of the comprehensive invasion, the breadth and gravity of sexual war crimes were startlingly pervasive. The main victims were predominantly females, particularly teenage girls, with the average age being fifteen years. However, the scope of these atrocities was not confined to women; they were witnessed amongst men, the elderly, and even in children and toddlers.
By Fall 2022, the United Nations had released its preliminary report on the multitude of Russian conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) incidents. The contents of the report were appalling, to say the least – detailing manifold incidents where women were gang-raped, men were emasculated, children were sexually violated, and civilians were coerced to parade naked on public thoroughfares. It is noteworthy that the extensive evidence supporting these atrocities often emanated from Russian documentation of their own horrendous actions.
Surprisingly, not only was evidence provided by Ukrainian exposure of these war crimes, but also documented by the very hands that committed them. From 2022 onwards, several instances came to light where Russian soldiers, in the throes of their brutality, filmed sexual assaults on children. Disturbingly, these atrocities were partially committed under the guise of creating content for child pornography sites, demonstrating a rather sinister profit-making motive.
Particularly egregious was an incident where an infant was raped on camera. The Russian soldiers involved actively disseminated the horrifying footage within Telegram groups. That same year, intercepted phone conversations between Russian soldiers and their spouses or partners revealed casual discussions about committing sexual violations against Ukrainian women.
In the progression of the war, the demographic of sexual war crimes victims shifted significantly. Instead of young civilian women being the primary victims, there emerged an increased prevalence of assaults directed at male POWs. The occupying Russians developed a perverse form of entertainment from these assaults, devising ‘games’ that involved torture masquerading as communication via makeshift telephones.
One horrific ‘game’ these soldiers played involved a field telephone; they would spin its wheel and make a call, meanwhile subjecting the attached prisoner to electrical torture. These inhumane acts included genital electrocution, referred to contemptuously as ‘Zelensky’s Call’, and were commuted with anal electrocution, derogatorily termed as ‘Biden’s Call’.
Another unsettling trend noted in CRSV accounts was the overt manifestation of sadism that was evident in the behaviour of Russian personnel. These individuals seemingly derived morbid enjoyment from inflicting sexual torture. One psychologist shared accounts police understandings ‘Okay, time to wrap up the fun’, effectively sanctioning the savagery with a flippant disregard for human dignity.
A chilling piece of evidence was discovered in homes formerly occupied by Russian soldiers in the liberated Kharkiv oblast in early 2022. Scrawled graffiti reading ‘It’s not considered a war crime if you had fun’ appalled the international community. This seemingly codified the disturbing correlation between delight and cruelty in these crimes.
Moreover, a pervasive culture of rape that appears to have roots in common Russian societal conditions has been observed. From an interpersonal standpoint, Russia has been characterized as a society steeped in humiliation, where teachers beating students, rampant child abuse, and pervasive interpersonal violence are commonplace. Many survivors have narrated how Russian troops justified their sexual violations as ‘punishments’.
To understand the current widespread sexual war crimes in Ukraine, it is necessary to draw connections between the past and the present. One influencing factor is the ideological obsession with a glorified, romanticized past, most notably seen in Putin’s reformulation of World War II as a solely Russian Soviet triumph.
In the words of historian Oksanen, this ‘Homo putinicus’ largely identifies with the need to revert to the past and the mythology of the Great Patriotic War. Putin’s reign has transformed this into something of a religious dogma, a narrative that facilitates the war crimes in Ukraine. The unconfronted history of wartime transgressions of the Soviet Red Army is referenced to elucidate the persistent culture of impunity that engenders the current situation.
In Oksanen’s understanding, Russia’s failure to condemn the ‘rape, pillage and additional war crimes’ of the Soviet Red Army has fueled the continuation of such crimes in Ukraine today. This culture of impunity has laid the groundwork for the recurrence of crimes, demonstrating how Russia’s deeply stained past engenders the repetition of horrors. To frame it bluntly, this widespread behavior constitutes a severe, systemic issue within Russia.
This diagnosis of Russia’s cultural illness is compellingly presented in a 2024 quote from Lithuanian minister Gabrielius Landsbergis: ‘I hear about the innocence of ordinary Russians… But then I see ordinary Russian mothers bidding farewell to their ordinary Russian sons, wishing them success in their ordinary Russian war crimes… Ordinary Russia is ill. It will be a lengthy, strenuous journey before healing can begin, and this process can only commence with the defeat of not just Putin, but Russia itself.’